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CHAPTER 18 
State and Municipal Government 
JOSEPH c. DUGGAN 
A. STATE GOVERNMENT 
§18.1. Massachusetts Port Authority. One of the major legislative 
proposals passed by the General Court during the 1956 session is con-
tained in Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1956, more commonly known as 
the Massachusetts Port Authority Bill. The objectives encompassed 
within the scope of this bill are: 
(1) The creation of a Massachusetts Port Authority, together with 
a definition of its powers and duties; 
(2) The transfer of the following existing facilities to the control 
and jurisdiction of the Authority: 
(a) Logan Airport and Hanscom Field 
(b) The Port of Boston 
(c) The Sumner Tunnel 
(d) The Mystic River Bridge 
(3) The construction of an additional vehicular crossing between 
Boston and East Boston; 
(4) Authorization to issue revenue bonds to provide funds for con-
struction of the additional crossing and to refinance existing facilities. 
As a result of the enactment of this bill, much prior legislation is 
repealed;! for example, the act creating the State Airport Management 
Board,2 and all legislation pertinent thereto since the Authority is 
to supervise the airports. 
Comment on the reasons which prompted the creation of the Au-
thority is appropriate and relevant. For the past six years, Logan 
International Airport and Hanscom Field, both state-owned airports, 
have steadily lost money despite the earnest efforts of the State Air-
port Management Board to curtail the losses and put the airports on 
a sound financial basis. 
The same may be said of the state-owned properties in the Port of 
Boston which also have suffered great loss. 
JOSEPH c. DUGGAN is City Solicitor for the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts. 
He is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars. 
The author is indebted to John J. Walsh for his assistance in the preparation of 
§18.1 and to J. Colin Lizotte and James W. Smith in the preparation of §18.6. The 
three are members of the Board of Student Editors. 
§18.1. 1 Acts of 1956, c. 465, §§30-35. 
1I G.L., c. 6, §§59A-59C. 
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In the light of this background, extensive study and investigation 
preceded the enactment of the bill; and the one salient factor revealed 
by these investigations and hearings was that the airfield and port 
agencies had both been tremendously hampered in their operations by 
their inordinate dependence on the slow-moving processes of legis-
lative appropriation whenever it was desired to plan developments 
entailing the expenditure of money. Like any other state department, 
they had to "worry the appropriation through" several bureaus and 
committees, the House, the Senate, and the Governor's office before 
they could be assured that funds would be at their disposal. 
These two primary considerations, namely, the ever-increasing losses 
and the slow-moving process of legislative appropriation, led to the 
suggestion being made in the General Court in 1955 to combine 
jurisdiction over the airports, the seaport, the Mystic River Bridge, 
and the Sumner Tunnel (plus a new crossing to be constructed), and to 
place them in the hands of a single managerial entity. The end result 
of many hearings, intensive investigations and much study which fol-
lowed upon this suggestion was the recommendation to create the 
Authority.3 
Seven picked men, experienced in the fields of finance, engineering, 
and labor relations will control the managerial policy of the Author-
ity. Furthermore, the Authority will be able to act without reference 
to the legislative budgetary formalities which thus far have hampered 
the operation of the airports and the Port of Boston, for it will be 
self-supporting through issuance and sale of its own revenue bonds. 
This provision, however, has raised the principal adverse criticism 
which may be leveled at the legislation, i.e., prospective purchasers of 
bonds should have a right to insist on some security to buttress the 
promise of the Authority to repay the amounts advanced. The act, 
however, other than providing for a trust agreement under the terms 
of which the tolls and other revenues of the Authority may be pledged 
to secure the bond issues,4 makes no further provision for security to 
bondholders. In fact, the bill specifically removes the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts from any role as guarantor,5 providing, in effect, that 
the bonds of the Authority are not to be considered as debts of the 
Commonwealth, or of any political subdivision thereof. It may be 
wondered why the Commonwealth has not availed itself of the chance 
to make the bonds that much more attractive either by subjecting the 
physical properties of the Authority to pledge, or by pledging its own 
financial resources, especially in view of the fact that the success or 
failure of the Authority depends in large measure on the success or 
failure of its sale of revenue bonds. 
3 The majority report of a Special Recess Commission set up in the General Court 
to investigate the feasibility of the suggestion is to be found in House No. 2575 
(1956). This majority report was the basic material from which the act was even-
tually formulated. 
4 Acts of 1956, c. 465, §12. 
Ii Id. §ll. 
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While this piece of legislation will undoubtedly give rise to a not 
inconsiderable spate of litigation, for many questions will necessarily 
develop concerning the interpretation of various sections of the act,6 
the indications lead to the conclusion that the Massachusetts Port 
Authority, like many similar governmental units in our sister states, 
will be accompanied with success and will accomplish its intended 
purposes to benefit the Commonwealth. 
§18.2. The Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corpora-
tion. Chapter 298 of the Acts of 1956 established a body corporate 
under the name of Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Cor-
poration, the aims and purposes of which are to provide financial 
assistance for higher education to students, their parents or guardians, 
or to approved educational institutions. 
This chapter also authorizes any financial institution and any do-
mestic corporation carrying on business within this Commonwealth 
to make contributions or loans to the Corporation, notwithstanding 
any rule at common law, or any provision of any general law, or any 
provision in their charters to the contrary. 
Furthermore, students may receive aid and assistance from the Cor-
poration even though they are under twenty-one; and for this pur-
pose, such minors are to have full legal capacity to act in their own 
behalf in the matter of contracts and other transactions, and with 
respect to such acts done by them they are to have all of the rights, 
powers, and privileges and will be subject to the obligations of per-
sons of full age. 
§18.3. Fiscal operation of the Commonwealth: Necessity of appro-
priation. On May 28, 1956, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial 
Court rendered an advisory opinionl consisting of answers to various 
questions propounded to them by the Senate concerning the constitu-
tionality of a proposed bill providing that a certain fund 2 be admin-
istered and expended by the Fish and Game Board for certain 
enumerated purposes but "without appropriation." 
The Court, after stating that the proposed bill was contrary to the 
budget and appropriation requirements contained in Article LXIII 
of the Amendments to the Constitution, supported its view by a dis-
cussion of the constitutional limitations surrounding the subject of 
expenditures and appropriations. 
The latter article includes the following provisions: "All money 
received on account of the commonwealth from any source whatsoever 
6 Section 4 and Section 5 both contain matter relative to the taking or use of 
private property, a type of legislative matter which invariably leads to litigation. 
§I8.3. lOpinion of the Justices, 1956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 665, 134 N.E.2d 892. 
2 The background is this: G.L., c. 131, §3A provides that moneys received by the 
Commonwealth from fishing and hunting license and permit fees, fines, etc., shall 
be credited on the books of the Commonwealth to a fund to be known as the inland 
fisheries and game fund. .. ... said fund ... shall be appropriated only for the 
purposes of developing, maintaining ... and administering the division of fisheries 
and game. Said fund, subject to appropriation, shall be used only [for enumerated 
purposes] ... " (Emphasis added.) 
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shall be paid into the treasury thereof";3 "Within three weeks after 
the convening of the general court the governor shall recommend to 
the general court a budget which shall contain a statement of all 
proposed expenditures of the commonwealth ... ";4 "All appropria-
tions based upon the budget ... shall be incorporated in a single 
bill which shall be called the general appropriation bill. . . ." 5 
In view of the provisions of G.L., c. 131, §3A and Article LXIII, 
§§1-3, it was obvious that the fund involved here was money received 
on account of the Commonwealth6 and was to be paid into its treas-
ury according to Article LXIII, §1; and it was required to be included 
in the budget according to Section 2; and to be disbursed under the 
general appropriation bill, or under a supplementary or special ap-
propriation bill according to Sections 3 and 4. Article LXIII, said 
the Court, was designed to place the fiscal operations of the Com-
monwealth as far as possible on a strict budgetary plan by which all 
money received on account of the Commonwealth from any source 
should be paid into its treasury, and all proposed expenditures of the 
Commonwealth should be included in some appropriation bill. In 
other words, it is quite manifest that the general intent and purpose 
underlying Article LXIII was to centralize the financial affairs of the 
Commonwealth in its own treasury, and place responsibility for their 
control in the General Court. 
The whole broad purpose of Article LXIII, which required all ex-
penditures to be included in some appropriation bill, could be largely 
defeated if various sources of income could be expended by adminis-
trative officers without appropriation. The bill in question, therefore, 
did not comply with the budgetary and appropriation requirements, 
for it would be an attempt to delegate to the Fish and Game Board 
powers of appropriation vested in the General Court, and, accord-
ingly, it would violate Article XXX of the Declaration of Rights re-
lating to the separation of powers. 
§18.4. Special commissions of the General Court: Amenability to 
process. An interesting decision was found in the case of Luscomb v. 
Bowker} in which the seven defendants involved were members of a 
special commission2 established for the purpose of conducting an 
investigation and study of the extent, character, and objects of Com-
munism, subversive activities, and related matters within the Com-
monwealth. The commission consisted of two members of the Senate, 
three members of the House of Representatives, and two appointees 
of the Governor. 
3 Mass. Const. Amend. Art. LXIII, §l. 
4Id. §2. 
!lId. §3. 
61956 Adv. Sh. 665. 667, 134 N.E.2d 892. 897, citing Opinion of the Justices, 297 
Mass. 577, 580-581, 9 N.E.2d 186, 188 (1937); Baker v. -Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 
490, 493, 45 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1942). 
§18.4. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1009, 136 N.E.2d 192. See also §5.2, supra, for further 
discussion. 
2 The commission was established by Resolves of 1953, c. 89. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/22
178 1956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSE'ITS LAW §18.5 
The commission having filed an interim report, and being about 
to file a final report which apparently would have included the name 
of any individual, concerning whom the commission has received credit-
able evidence that such individual is a member of the communist party, 
the plaintiff brought a bill for injunctive relief against further publica-
tion of the statements hereinbefore described, alleging that reference 
to the plaintiff in the report of the commission, its publication and 
imminent further publication violated her constitutional rights. 
In the Superior Court the case took a peculiar turn after service 
had been made on the members of the commission. They filed plead-
ings entitled "Motion to Dismiss," wherein each, "without submitting 
to the jurisdiction" of the court but "protesting against such juris-
diction," asserted that he was answerable only to the General Court, 
and moved that the bill be dismissed. The Superior Court allowed 
these motions and decreed that no further process issue in the premises. 
The Supreme Judicial Court felt there was error in that part of the 
final decree prohibiting issuance of process on the ground that no 
member or officer of the legislature was immune from the service of 
civil process where no arrest had been made. The Massachusetts Con-
stitution provides3 that a member of the House is exempt from arrest 
"during his going into, returning from, or his attending the general 
assembly." But in this case, no arrest had been made or was con-
templated. In Long v. Ansell,4 it was held that a Senator of the 
United States was not immune from the service of summons in an 
action for libel, although he could not be placed under arrest.1I 
The great weight of authority appears to hold that a member of 
the legislature is not exempt from the service of any civil process not 
involving arrest.6 Therefore, a member of the legislature is not exempt 
from suit by an individual which is designed to test the constitu-
tionality of the action of the legislator. By the same token, the mem-
bers of the commission who were not members of the legislature could 
not stand in any better position.7 To epitomize, this opinion decided 
only that the plaintiff had a right to present her case, and for that 
purpose, to have process against all of the defendants, so that all might 
be heard before the case was decided as to any of them. The decrees 
allowing the motions to dismiss. directed solely to the want of juris-
diction, were reversed. 
B. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
§18.5. Construction and interpretation of certain zoning by-laws. 
A zoning ordinance permitting the construction and use in a general 
3 Part II, e. 1, §3, Art. X. 
4293 U.S. 76, 55 Sup. Ct. 21, 79 L. Ed. 208 (1934). 
/I See also Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376-377, 71 Sup. Ct. 783, 788, 95 
L. Ed. 1019, 1027 (1951). 
6 Phillips v. Browne, 270 Ill. 450, 110 N.E. 601 (1915); Johnson v. Offutt, 4 Mete. 
19 (Ky. 1862); Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542, 57 N.W. 212 (1892); Berlet v. Weary, 
67 Neb. 75, 93 N.W. 238 (1903); Gentry v. Griffith, Hyatt 8e Co., 27 Tex. 461 (1864). 
7 See Opinion of the Justices, 331 Mass. 764, 119 N.E.2d 385 (1954). 
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residence district of a building for a "Public or semi-public institution 
of a philanthropic, charitable, or religious character, but not a cor-
rectional institution," was involved in Gangi v. Board of Appeals of 
Salem.1 Here the question presented was: Would the construction 
and use of a building by the Animal Rescue League of Boston in a 
zoned general residential district, which building would serve as an 
office and shelter for animals, be in violation of the zoning ordinance? 
Previously, in Minns v. Billings,2 it was held that both the Massachu-
setts Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Animal Res-
cue League were public charities and their organizations were also re-
ferred to as "institutions." In the Gangi case, the Court further 
stated that the term "institution" may be applied both to the organiza-
tion, i.e. the League, and to the place where its operations are con-
ducted, i.e. the shelter. Therefore, both the League itself and its pro-
posed shelter were treated as falling within the scope of the phraseology 
of the ordinance. 
Very often, other pertinent statutes must be interpreted and corre-
lated in conjunction with zoning statutes so as to permit proper ap-
plication of the latter. 
A writ of mandamus was brought in Meadows v. Town Clerk of 
Saugus3 to require the town clerk, under applicable licensing laws, to 
issue a kennel license for operation on premises in an area zoned for 
residences. The Court held that the subject matter of the kennel 
license was not simply a pack of dogs and that the license itself was 
one covering the location or premises where the dogs were to be kept; 
and this being so, the petitioners could not compel the respondent to 
issue a license covering a location in a residence district where the 
maintenance of the kennel, otherwise permissible, would be in viola-
tion of the zoning by-law. 
§18.6. School committee powers. Historically, broad powers have 
been vested in school committees relative to promulgation of rules 
and regulations for the government and management of the schools 
under their charge.1 In Dowd v. Town of Dover2 the question was 
raised as to whether these broad powers of general supervision over 
public schools extend to closing of schools, or whether such closing lies 
solely within the province of the town itself. A petition was brought 
by ten taxpayers of Dover under G.L., c. 40, §53 seeking to enjoin the 
school committee from abolishing teachers' positions by closing Dover 
High School, and from contracting with the town of Needham to 
send its pupils to Needham on a tuition basis. The Superior Court 
having ruled that the school committee acted within its powers in so 
doing, and having dismissed the petition, on appeal the Supreme 
§18.5. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 625. 134 N.E.2d 451. 
2183 Mass. 126. 130. 66 N.E. 593. 595 (1903). 
8333 Mass. 760. 133 N.E.2d 498 (1956). 
§18.6. 1 Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield. 241 Mass. 325. 330, 135 
N.E. 459, 461 (192.5). C.L., c. 71, §37 provides that the school committee has "general 
charge of all public schools." 
21956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 441, 133 N.E.2d 501. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/22
180 1956 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.6 
Judicial Court affirmed the action of the lower court by citing prior 
cases3 where it was decided that school committees unquestionably had 
power to close schools under the broad construction given to G.L., 
c. 71, §37. 
The question of the scope of contractual powers of school commit-
tees was presented in another guise in School Committee of Salem v. 
Gavin.4 General Laws, c. 43, §29 provides in substance that all con-
tracts made by any department or board (the school committee being 
such a "department" or "board" within the meaning of c. 43, §29) 
where the amount involved is $1000 or more shall not be deemed to 
have been made or executed until approved by the mayor. On the 
other hand Sections 37 and 38 of the same chapter provide that school 
committes shall have general charge of the public schools, and shall 
elect, and contract with, teachers. In the Gavin case, the majority 
of the school committee voted to give the defendant coach of football 
a three-year contract at a salary of $2500 a season. The mayor of 
Salem did not concur in the committee's action. The school commit-
tee the following year brought a bill for declaratory relief under G.L., 
c. 231A seeking to have the contract declared invalid because it did 
not bear the approval of the mayor. The contract having been de-
clared invalid, the defendant coach thereupon appealed; and it was 
held that the subject matter of the contract was one over which the 
authority of the school committee was supreme; and, accordingly, it 
was not subject to the provisions of G.L., c. 43, §29, and was valid 
though not approved by the mayor. The Court carefully distinguished 
this case of a contract for professional services, analogous to that of 
a contract with a teacher, which traditionally has been under the 
exclusive and untrammeled control of school committees, from con-
tract cases of a commercial nature, e.g. a contract for the transporta-
tion of pupils which would not be valid without the approval of the 
mayor as in Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway v. Mayor of Fall 
River.1> 
A third case, however, illustrates the point that school committees 
are not completely autonomous. In Young v. City of Worcester6 it 
was held that a vote to increase the salary of the superintendent of 
schools, passed by the school committee forty-three days after the city 
manager had submitted the annual budget to the city council, was 
not timely. The day following the vote the council adopted the 
budget for the city, including the item for the superintendent's salary 
as originally submitted by the school department. 
Although no time is expressly fixed by statute for determining the 
municipality'S obligation to provide whatever funds the school com-
3 Knowles v. Boston, 12 Gray 339 (Mass. 1859); Morse v. Ashley, 193 Mass. 294, 
79 N.E. 481 (1906); Jantzen v. School Committee of Chelmsford, 332 Mass. 175, 
124 N.E.2d 534 (1955). 
4333 Mass. 632, 132 N.E.2d 396 (1956). 
I) 308 Mass. 232, 31 N.E.2d 543 (1941). 
41 333 Mass. 724, 133 N.E.2d 211 (1956). 
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mittee within its powers requests, the Court was of the opinion that 
the critical date was the date of the submission of the annual budget 
to the city council. This was felt to be the necessary implication of 
G.L., c. 44, §§32 and 33. These sections provide that the city manager 
is to submit to the city council an annual budget within forty-five days 
after the annual organization of the city government. Thereafter the 
council has forty-five days in which to consider the controllable items 
of appropriation. To do so intelligently, it needs to know the total 
of the proposed budget, including the total of fixed items over which 
it has no control, such as school department estimates. The Court also 
thought that Section 33A, which provides that the annual budget shall 
contain sums sufficient to pay the salaries of officers and employees 
fixed by law or by ordinance, implied the same provision for the other 
class of fixed items. Accordingly, the estimates of the school commit-
tee entailing a required appropriation had to be in the city manager's 
hands by the time he brought the recommended annual budget into 
existence, which occurred when he submitted it to the city council. 
While this rule does not affect the school committee's admitted 
power and right to establish the superintendent's salary, it does show 
that the exercise of that power, particularly as it relates to a supple-
mentary appropriation, is not without restriction. 
§18.7. Validity of takings by eminent domain and easement. The 
off-street parking lot has now become such a necessary public utility 
that many communities have been constrained to take private land by 
eminent domain for the purposes of constructing public parking places. 
In Tate v. City of Malden)1 it was held that the statute2 under which 
the city acted authorized the taking of the land for such public pur-
pose even though the land was at the time of taking utilized by the 
private owners for public parking, the exact same use to which the 
city intended to put the land. The Court said that the taking was 
necessary, although the private owners were themselves using the land 
for a public parking lot, because at any moment the private owners 
might decide to sell the land or use it for purposes other than public 
parking. 
§18.8. Pensions: Basis for computation, and presumptions relative 
to annuities. Under the provisions of G.L., c. 32, §58, a veteran who 
has been in the service of the Commonwealth, or any county, city, 
and so forth, for a total period of thirty years in the aggregate shall 
" ... be retired from active service at sixty-five per cent of the highest 
annual rate of compensation, including any bonuses paid in lieu of 
additional salary or as a temporary wage increase in addition to his 
regular compensation. . .." In Smith v. City of Lowell? the plaintiff, 
chief engineer in the water department, brought a bill in equity for 
a declaratory judgment as to the amount of retirement allowance to 
§18.7. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 136 N.E.2d 188. 
2 Acts of 1954, c. 600. 
§18.8. 11956 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1037, 136 N.E.2d 186. 
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which he was entitled. As chief engineer, he was responsible for the 
employees in the engine room and, there being no one qualified and 
available to relieve him, was required to work seven days each week. 
His total wages in the last year of his employment were $5991.06. 
The question for decision was whether the retirement allowance 
should be 65 percent of that amount, or of a much smaller amount 
based on what his compensation would have been for a normal five-
day, forty-hour week even though he worked seven days a week. On 
appeal by the city from a final decree declaring that the highest an-
nual rate of compensation was $5991.06 (his total wages in his last year 
of employment), the Supreme Judicial Court undertook to decide 
"what was the employee's highest annual rate of compensation." In 
answering the question, the Court analyzed the objective of the statute, 
which was to provide for a retired employee an annual allowance 
amounting to a certain percentage of the regular compensation re-
ceived by him before retirement. Since none of plaintiff's regular 
compensation could properly be considered payment for "overtime" 
because it was payment for his customary work ("overtime pay" not 
being computable in determining the highest annual rate of compen-
sation), it followed that his regular compensation was in the amount 
found by the master, i.e. his total wages, and not the amount based 
on what his compensation would be for a five-day, forty-hour week. 
§18.9. The Massachusetts "heart law." The Massachusetts "heart 
law," so-called, was construed in Selectmen of West Springfield v. Hoar,! 
wherein an annuity was claimed by the widow of a police officer who 
died of heart disease, the claim being made under G.L., c. 32, §89A, 
which provides: "If an employee ... dies as a natural and proximate 
result of undergoing a hazard peculiar to his employment, while in 
the performance of his duty ... there shall ... be paid ... to the 
following dependents of such deceased person the following an-
nuities: ... " 
The question raised was whether the presumption defined in G.L., 
c. 32, §94, the "heart law," applied in instances where a widow's an-
nuity was claimed under the foregoing Section 89A. 
The presumption of Section 94 reads as follows: "any condition 
of impairment of health caused by . . . heart disease resulting in 
total or partial disability to a ... permanent member of a police 
department . . . who successfully passed a physical examination on 
entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evi-
dence of such condition, shall be presumed to be suffered in the line 
of duty." 
The plaintiff selectmen contended that the presumption in Section 
94 related only to "any condition of impairment of health" and to 
"total or partial disability," and contained no reference whatever to 
"death"; and consequently the presumption was intended only for 
the benefit of "living" potential pensioners and not for the benefit of 
"dependent potential annuitants" under Section 89A. 
§18.9. 1111111 Mass. 257, 1110 N.E.2d 570 (1955). 
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The Court found, however, that other considerations tended in the 
opposite direction from the contention of the plaintiffs. The Court 
felt that since the retirement laws do provide for allowances to de-
pendents in the event of service-connected death, as well as for al-
lowances to the living for service-connected disabilities, and since Sec-
tion 94 relates only to a presumption that heart disease is service-
connected, it would seem natural to conclude that the presumption 
should apply in cases of death from that cause, as well as in cases of 
disability. 
It might also be noted that Chapter 374 of the Acts of 1956 amends 
that portion of Chapter 32 of the General Laws dealing with pensions 
for policemen and firemen by inserting after Section 851 a new Section 
85J, which provides that any policeman or fire fighter eligible for 
superannuation retirement shall have the right at the time of his re-
tirement to elect one of two options for payments of his pension. 
Under Option A, the full yearly amount of pension is payable under 
Sections 80-85. Under Option B, a lesser amount of yearly pension 
is payable to the policeman or fire fighter during his lifetime, with 
a provision that one half of the yearly amount of such lesser pension 
shall be continued during the lifetime of and paid to his widow.2 
§18.10. Civil service: Discharge while suspension in effect. In the 
case of Mayor of Newton v. Civil Service Commission,! the question 
arose as to whether an appointing authority could discharge a person 
in the classified service who was at the time of the discharge under 
a previous unexpired definite suspension.2 To the contention that 
the appointing authority had no right to take dismissal action against 
the civil service employee because at the time of discharge he was 
separated from the police service by reason of previous suspension, 
the Court replied by distinguishing between "suspension" and "dis-
missal," pointing out that it was a distinction of substance and not 
merely one of form. "Suspension," said the Court, "imports the pos-
sibility or likelihood of return to the work when the reason for sus-
pension ceases to be operative. Dismissal imports an ending of the 
employment." 3 
However tenuous the grasp that the employee might have had on 
the office while suspended, up to the time he was ordered discharged 
by the appointing authority the door had not been entirely closed; 
therefore, the Court felt that the appointing authority was not re-
quired to wait until the expiration of his suspension before proceed-
ing against him for his other later conduct leading to discharge while 
under the definite, unexpired suspension. 
As to the suspension of civil servants, it should also be noted that 
G.L., c. 43, §43 has been amended by Section 1 of Chapter 629, Acts 
2 Acts of 1956, c. 374, now G.L., c. 32, §85J gives the manner in which the lesser 
amount in Option B is computed. 
§18.10. 1333 Mass. 340, 130 N.E.2d 690 (1955). 
2 C.L., c. 31, §43(b) specifies the manner in which hearing is afforded. 
3333 Mass. 340,344, 130 N.E.2d 690, 692 (1955). 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1956 [1956], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1956/iss1/22
184 1956 ANNUAL StJRVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §18.10 
of 1956, by striking out paragraph (e), and inserting in its place a new 
subsection. Prior to amendment, a suspension for a period not ex-
ceeding five days could only be made pending a hearing which was 
required to be held by the appointing authority within five days; 
under the amendatory act, however, the suspension may be ordered 
for just cause, and hearing on the question of whether there was just 
cause will be afforded only when requested by the suspended employee. 
Section 2 of Chapter 629 further amends Chapter 31, Section 43 by 
adding a new subsection (g) which contains the same provisions as 
amended paragraph (e) and applies to imposition of punishment duty 
on police officers for disciplinary purposes. 
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